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UNDERSTANDING JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACHES TO ISLAM:
ASSESSING THE U.S. COURTS APPROACH TO THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW, RELIGION 
AND COMMERCE
MARC L. ROARK*
SUMMARY
The United States recent deal with a United Arab Emirites Company to operate seven 
U.S. Ports highlights a growing tension in U.S. and Arabic commercial relations.  One 
tension that has remained unnoticed is the role that U.S  Courts play in interpreting 
Islamic texts when the commercial or legal outcome depends on an understanding of the 
religious culture. This article describes seven cases that demonstrate various approaches 
to this problem.   This article utilizes an approach by James Boyd White, and suggests 
that translation or its kin transliteration can help judges in deciding Islamic legal 
principles.  
ARTICLE
Robert Cover in his now famous (and controversial) article Nomos and Narrative
began by informing us that we “inhabit a nomos – a normative universe.”1  By normative 
universe, Cover means to tell us that our world is constantly juxtaposed between 
principles of right and wrong – rights and wrongs that are intrinsically and inseparably 
connected to the narrative that forms them.2 That narrative and norms compliment each 
other is nothing new; that narrative and norms create separate worlds of occupation that 
collide with one another in concrete and specific ways is another problem all together.  
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1 Robert M. Cover, Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1984).
2 Id. at 5.  
Our lot in this piece is to illustrate what happens when two nomos engage one another in 
the specific context of the legal system.  
As Perry Crane said in his own grappling of Cover’s understanding of a nomos –
the encounter of one nomos with another is not just a clash of wills, or a test of 
commitments, but an effort at cognition.3 Nowhere is law more normative than when it is 
based on religious expression.  (That does not mean that other law is not normative if 
based on something other than religion; only that religion tends to create a super-
normative law – laws that carry eternal consequences so to speak). Thus, when two 
normative systems that are built around different suppositions meet in judicial process, 
courts must utilize some tool of cognition and response to adequately address the 
concerns each norm presents.  As the discourse of law is considered across cultural and 
ethnic boundaries, the analogy of translation becomes a useful tool for navigating  that
cognition.  
James Boyd White, in his work Justice as Translation, suggests that translation is 
ultimately an art of recognition and response, both to another person and another 
language; that translation transports the translator away from his own language and to a 
place between languages (and people) where differences are more easily comprehended; 
and that translation is inherently a self-limiting process.4  This essay builds on White’s 
analogy, and uses his definitions to consider how United States Courts ruminate about 
Islamic law when confronted with tensions between Islamic practice and modern 
commercial practice. 
3
 Perry Dane, The Public, The Private, and the Sacred: Variations on the Theme of 
Nomos and Narrative, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 15, 16 (1996).   
4
 JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 230 (1990).  
Before proceeding to analyze the trends, some general observations are worth 
noting.  First, there is no Islamic law per se that U.S. Courts recognize; rather the laws 
are tied to specific nation states, such as the law of Saudi Arabia, Iran or Afghanistan.5
Nevertheless, courts recognize the conceptual links between countries that share in 
common a system of Shari’a and proceed as operating under a generic “Islamic Law.”6
Thus, the comparison to the “common law” forms an easy conceptual bridge for judges 
attempting to understand how principles of Islamic law relate to the laws of nations.7
Second, the courts treat the application of foreign law as a hybrid question of law 
and fact; that is, under varying rules of civil procedure, foreign law is a question of law to 
be determined by the court.8  However, the “fact” of a foreign law is still up to debate.  
Therefore, courts will often hold evidentiary hearings, eliciting expert testimony from 
both sides, and even engaging its own expert to get to the “fact” of the law.9  This 
analysis itself can be deceptive.  Suggesting that the law is a fact, instead of a norm or a 
principle suggests that the law itself can be apprehended apart from the culture that the 
law (or laws) derives from.10
5 See e.g., Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 893, 897 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) 
(Afghani law); CPS Int’l v. Dresser Industries Inc., 911 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1995) (Saudi Arabian law); Saudi Basic Oil Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu 
Petrochemical, 866 A.2d 1, 11 (Del. 2005) (Saudi Arabian law); Blackstone v. Aramco 
Inc., No. 80-44642, 1991 WL 63630 (Tex. Ct. App. 4/25/1991) (Saudi Arabian law); 
Chadwick v. Arabian American Oil Co., 656 F.Supp. 857 (D. Del. 1987) (Saudi Arabian 
law); National Group for Communications and Computers v. Lucent Technologies Int’l 
Inc., 331 F.Supp. 2d 290 (D.N.J. 2004) (Saudi Arabian law). 
6 See SABIC, 866 A.2d at 31 (applying “Islamic law”); Blackstone, 1991 WL 63630 at *3 
(applying “Shari’a”).  
7 See Chadwick, 656 F.Supp. at 861 (calling Shari’a “the common law of Saudi 
Arabia.”). 
8 See Bridas, 16 S.W.3d at 899. 
9 See SABIC, 866 A.2d at 31. 
10 See Cover, supra note 1.
Third, there is a certain negotiation that occurs in the American legal system that 
needs to be reckoned with.  The American legal system is a purely adversarial system of 
law; that is, as litigants prepare their legal arguments, they do so with the aim not of 
achieving justice but of winning, though I doubt few litigants consider their cases to be
unjust.11   The result is that the expert in opining about the law and attempting to establish 
“the fact of the law” is doing so to further his client’s economic interests.  That experts 
are paid to give their testimony only complicates this matter.  For example, Frank Vogel 
served as an expert in four of the seven cases reviewed for this article.   In two of those 
four cases, Vogel’s testimony appears to be a conservative reading of Islamic law; by 
conservative, I mean more literally formalistic.  For example, he suggests in Bridas Corp. 
v. Unocal Corp. that Islamic Law would not allow for the tort of Interference with a 
Contract because of the firm maxim that whoever does an act bears ultimate 
responsibility.12  Yet, in NGCC v. Lucent Technologies, Vogel is willing to stray from 
firm maxims towards interpretive results.  Though agreeing that traditionally, the 
principle of gharar would disallow future type damages, he opines that “higher 
valuations of damages are possible as long as the future event is not an explicit condition 
of the contract, and that uncertainty that is subsumed within a larger entity, such as a 
corporation, would be upheld , and that it is only when gharar inheres within a separate 
entity is it forbidden.”13  While there may be no direct contradiction in Vogel’s thought 
process, there appears to be a conflict between a rigid application of traditional Islamic 
law concepts and interpretive ones.  The deciding factor is whose behalf the expert is 
11 See Jonathan D. Martin, Historians at the Gates: Accommodating Expert Historical 
Testimony in Federal Courts, 78 NYU L. REV. 1518, 1547 (2003); CITE
12 Bridas, 16 S.W.3d at 905. 
13 NGCC, 331 F.Supp.2d at 295. 
testifying. Judges, therefore, seeking to find the “fact” of the law, must be leery in 
accepting the position of experts who have an interest in their testimony.
Finally, the medium in which we receive the translation -- (for the reader this 
article, and for I the writer, case reporters and Westlaw print outs) inhibits our ability to 
assess the court’s function.  One way of measuring the reaction and the response to 
foreign words, phrases and language is the use of body language and subtle suggestions.14
Of course, we (you the reader and I the commentator) sit well away from the Court 
proceedings that rendered these decisions.  We can’t see furrowed brows, judges and 
juries leaning forward, or court reporters with confused looks attempting to spell words 
they had never heard before.  Sometimes, we sit even further back as the description I 
reviewed is another court’s (the appellate court’s) perception of what the trial court or 
magistrate did in a particular case.  These limitations are not debilitating.  Rather, 
acknowledging the limitations of our perceptions in these cases actually frees us to 
acknowledge that this assessment towards translation is, at the very least, incomplete.
Part one of this article sets the stage by describing in detail seven cases as 
reported by the courts, with limited commentary from outside sources.  Part two
categorizes the opinions as approaching the issues formalistically, interpretively, or by 
using something akin to a model of translation. Part three continues the discussion from 
part two, drawing conclusions about the various approaches and qualities of each. Part 
four suggests that the role that judges perceive themselves as engaging is quite predictive 
in how the court will assess Islamic concepts. 
14 See WHITE, supra note ___, at 330-31. 
These cases are efforts by the judiciary to come to terms with law that is both 
culturally and normatively variant from its ordinary course and consideration.  This 
article considers, along the lines of White’s discussion, how the court translates Islamic 
law.  In other words, how the court reacts to and responds to Islamic law, in the face of 
Western commercial conceptions and legal assumptions. Also, it considers how the Court 
comprehends the differences inherent in the two legal systems and navigates those 
differences towards judicial resolution.  And how the court embraces a self-limiting 
process.  
PART ONE
THE CASES
1. Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).  
In April 2000, the Texas State Court of Appeals for the fourteenth district decided 
Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp15 -- a contentious matter involving two oil companies and 
their rights to build a natural gas pipeline through Afghanistan.  In 1991, the former 
Soviet Union disbanded leaving several independent nations; one of those nations was 
Turkmenistan.  Turkmenistan is located on the Caspian Sean, bordering Iran to its south, 
Afghanistan to its east and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to its north. Importantly, 
Turkmenistan is one of the ten most promising countries for extracting hydrocarbons 
from the earth;16 hydrocarbons are necessary elements for the production of petroleum 
and natural gas resources.  
15
 16 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). 
16
 U.S. Geological Survey 2004 at ___. 
In 1991, Turkmenistan began soliciting offers to develop its natural resources.17
Shortly thereafter, Bridas Corp. (“Bridas”) entered into an agreement with the 
Turkmenistan Government to develop the nation’s hydrocarbons in certain areas.18
Bridas is a South American Oil Company that had little to no experience in Asian 
governmental practices.  Their first foray into Asia came in Western Siberia.  But as 
Carlos Bulgheroni told Ahmed Rashid, “there were too many problems [in Siberia] with 
pipelines and taxes, so we arrived in Turkmenistan when it opened up.”19 Perhaps a 
naivety towards Asian relations was to Bulgheroni’s and Bridas’s credit; though western 
oil companies scoffed at the Bridas/ Turkmenistan contract, because of the politics, 
geography, or potential loss, Bridas was convinced that it could generate and transport 
natural resources in the same ways it had done so in South America.20  Succinctly, lack of 
experience in governmental affairs did not mean the company could not be successful at 
17 Bridas Corp. 16 S.W.3d at 895. 
18
 Bridas Corp was contracted to explore the Keimir block in the western part of the 
country and the Yashlar Block in the eastern portion of Turkmenistan. Bridas Corp., 16 
S.W.3d at 895.  See also AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL, AND 
FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 158 (2000)
19 RASHID, supra note 4, at 158.  Rashid sees Bridas Corp. and Bulgheroni’s experience 
in Turkmenistan as an extension of early twentieth century conflation of oil and foreign 
policy.  His description of Bulgheroni captures the imagination much in the same way 
that descriptions of John D. Rockefeller of the late nineteenth century impugn images of 
the pious dictator -- “charming, erudite, a philosopher captain of industry, he could talk 
for hours about the collapse of Russia, the future of the oil industry, or Islamic 
fundamentalism.”  Id. 
20 Id. Bhulghani says that “other oil companies shied away from Turkmenistan because 
they thought it a gas place and had no idea where to market it.  Our experience in 
discovering and transporting it through cross-border pipelines to multiple markets in 
Latin America convinced me that the same could be done in Turkmenistan.” Id.  
Apparently no other Western oil companies bothered with presenting proposals to the 
Turkmenistan government. Id. The fact that Bridas was the only company to submit 
offers resulted in Bridas receiving extremely favorable terms for the drilling, namely a 
75-25 split in profits in Bridas’s favor in the region of Keimir and a 50-50 split in the 
region of Yashlar. 
excavation as exploratory drilling by Bridas discovered a natural gas reserve holding an 
estimated twenty-seven trillion cubic feet of gas.21  Though Turkmenistan had no need 
for such production, Pakistan did and executed an agreement with Turkmenistan to 
purchase the gas for a period of thirty years.  
Because Pakistan did not border Turkmenistan, international cooperation was 
imperative to the Pakistani Turkmen deal.22  The most direct route was through 
Afghanistan, whose stability was becoming more and more tenuous with the emergence 
of the Taliban as a controlling government of the region.  Bulgheroni opened negotiations 
with the Afghan warlords that ruled the Afghan territories, and proposed the construction 
of an 875-mile pipeline from Yashlar, Turkmenistan to Sui in the southern province of 
Pakistan.23  The Afghan tribal leaders embraced the Bridas proposal and Bridas prepared 
to move forward.24 Bridas contacted Unocal Corp. in 1995 and extended an invitation for 
Unocal to participate with Bridas in the development of the Turkmenistan hydrocarbon 
project.  Importantly, no agreements were consummated between Unocal and Bridas.25
21 See Bridas Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 895.  Importantly, Bridas Corp. invested more than 
U.S.$400 Million in exploring its leases, as Rashid says “a staggering sum in those early 
days when not even oil majors were involved in Central Asia.  Bridas was successful in 
its overall operations extracting upwards of 16,800 Barrels of Oil per day. But the big 
discovery was in the Yashlar region and the massive repository of natural gas.  RASHID, 
supra note 4, at 158.  
22 See RASHID supra note 4, at 895.  Interestingly, Bulgheroni saw a pipeline of peace 
through Afghanistan.  With the Afghani turbulence coming to a head with the seizure of 
Khandahar by the Taliban, Bulgheroni saw his pipeline as “a peace-making business.”  
Id. 
23 Id. at 159. 
24 Id. One of the appealing aspects of the Bridas proposal was the open-access nature of 
the pipeline.  Afghanistan at one time supplied Uzbekistan with Natural Gas reserves, but 
had shut them down in the wake of national chaos. Id. 
25 Bridas Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 896.  
What followed in the summer of 1995 were independent efforts by Bridas and 
Unocal to secure the pipeline construction contract from Turkmenistan.26  Turkmenistan 
rejected several proposals by Bridas before accepting an offer from Unocal to build the 
pipeline in the Turkmenistan territory.27  Bridas then turned its attention to Afghanistan 
and courting certain Afghan officials to an exclusive agreement to build the Afghanistan 
pipeline.28  In November 1996, Bridas disclosed that it had signed an agreement with the 
Taliban, the political party controlling Afghanistan,  to construct the pipeline across 
Afghanistan; despite being untrue (Bridas actually only contracted with one person who 
claimed to deliver the Taliban)29 Unocal was nevertheless panicked by the news and 
attempted to use Pakistani officials to sway the Taliban to their side.30  Bridas had paid 
$1 Million to Barhanuddin Rabboni, who controlled less than half of the Afghanistan 
26 Id. Rashid suggests that Unocal’s involvement and eventual success in obtaining the 
contracts related to two factors.  First, Bridas was subject of rumors of ill-gotten gain by 
the advisors to Turkmenistan President Saparmurad  Niyazov.  Second, Turkmenistan 
officials, Niyazov in particular saw the financial possibilities of securing an American oil 
major to the project.  Particularly, Niyazov believed that Unocal’s involvement might 
lure the attention of the Clinton Administration to invest development funds in 
Turkmenistan. Rashid, supra note 4, at 160.   
27Bridas Corp, 16 S.W.3d at 896.  The agreement between Unocal and Turkmenistan 
provided that Unocal would construct the pipeline, purchase natural gas from 
Turkmenistan at the Afghanistan border, and that Turkmenistan reserved the right to 
select the natural resources dedicated to the project. Id.  
Apparently the Unocal contract shocked the Bridas executives that had been 
working to secure the pipeline deal. “We were shocked and when we spoke to Niyazov, 
he just turned around and said, ‘why don’t you build a second pipeline.’” See Rashid, 
supra note 4, at 160.  
28
 For an enlightening discussion relating to the benefits Bridas offered the Taliban, see 
Rashid, supra note 4 at 166-169.  
29 Id. at 169.  
30
 What is clear is that the Taliban was able to leverage Bridas and Unocal against one 
another.  Rashid indicates that the Taliban secretly favored Bridas because of their laissez 
faire stance towards the humanitarian issues that were becoming a public issue for the 
Taliban.  However, the Taliban also coveted U.S. recognition -- recognition that would 
bring money for roads, electricity, and other development.  Id. 
territory, and was losing more territory daily.31  Subsequently, Rabboni was forced from 
the capital city of Kabul and into the Northeastern corner of the country.  The ending of 
the story was that neither Bridas nor Unocal completed the project.  In 1999, Unocal 
withdrew from the project after several unsuccessful attempts to court Afghan officials.  
Bridas, whose assets in Turkmenistan were frozen by the Turkmen government, sought 
arbitration against Turkmenistan to enforce its earlier agreements.  And ultimately, 
Bridas Corp. brought a $15 Billion lawsuit against Unocal in the Texas State Court for 
tortuous interference with a contractual relationship.  
The Texas State Court conducted a two part analysis: first it decided what laws 
applied to the matter at hand; and second, whether those laws recognized the tort claim 
for interference with a contractual relationship.  
Regarding the Choice of Law question, the Court used the Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws to determine that either Turkmen or Afghan law would apply to this 
dispute, and not Texas law as urged by Bridas.32 The Court applied the “most significant 
31 Bridas Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 896.  
32 Id. at 897.  The Restatement (Second) identifies seven factors to be considered when a 
state has no legislative directive towards applying foreign law: (1) the needs of the 
interstate and international systems; (2) the relevant policies of the forum; (3) the relevant 
policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue; (4) the protection of justified expectations; (5) the 
basic policies underlying the particular field of law; (6) certainty, predictability and 
uniformity of results; and (7) ease in the determination and application of the law to be 
applied.  See Restatement 2d Conflict of Laws § 6.  Moreover, section 145 of the 
restatement identifies several issues to be considered when applying section 6 to a tort 
matter: (1) the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are 
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles state in 
section 6; and (2) contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of Section 6 
to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury 
occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, 
residence, nationality, place of incorporation ad place of business of the parties; and (d) 
relationship” test to analyze the contacts to the various forums.  The Court first 
determined that the situs of injury occurred in Turkmenistan and in Afghanistan rather 
than in Texas.33 Next the Court determined that the conduct causing the injury to Bridas 
occurred in Turkmenistan or Afghanistan.34 The third factor relating to the parties 
respective places of incorporation and principle places of business also weighed in 
Unocal’s favor, as neither company was incorporated in Texas and neither maintained 
more than a satellite office in Houston.35  Fourth, the Court found that there was no 
business relationship previously existing between Unocal and Bridas Corp. to salvage an 
application of Texas law.36 Finally, the court rejected Bridas’s claims that Texas Public 
Policy warrants application of Texas law to this matter.  Claiming that the state of Texas 
the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.  These contacts 
are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular 
issue.  Id. § 145.     The Court finally applied section 156 to the problem in understanding 
how section 145 and section 6 comport.  
Importantly, the Bridas Court followed precedent established by the Texas 
Supreme Court and another appellant court with similar facts. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 
583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979) & CPS Int’l Inc. v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 911 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1995).  For an expanded discussion of CPS, see infra notes ___, and text 
accompanying. 
33 Bridas Corp, 16 S.W.3d at 897-98.  
34
 In making this determination, the Court relied on CPS Int’l v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 911 
S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).  In CPS Int’l, the plaintiffs  alleged tortious interference 
with a contract arising in Saudi Arabia.  The Court held that the fact that  tortious conduct 
may have been directed from the state of Texas does not alter the reality that the conduct 
was directed to and carried out in Saudi Arabia, and it was the carrying out of the conduct 
that was the source of its harmful nature.” 
Bridas Corp. argued unsuccessfully that the holding in CPS Int’l resulted in an 
unjust result.  The Court additionally cited facts that weighed heavily towards the 
application of foreign law, including: the acknowledgement by Bridas Chief Operating 
Officer that the interference occurred in Turkmenistan; and the fact that the gas contracts 
and protocols were not negotiated in Texas but in Turkmenistan.  See Bridas Corp, 16 
S.W.3d at 898.  
35 Id. at 898-99.  Bridas Corp. is incorporated in the British Virgin Islands with a 
principle place of business in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  Unocal is a Delaware 
Corporation  headquartered in California.  Id. 
36 Id. 
has an interest in regulating companies doing business in its borders, together with the 
difficulty in predicting and ascertaining both Turkmen and Afghan law, Bridas urged the 
rejection of foreign law in favor of Texas state law.  The Court rejected both arguments 
and spent the rest of the opinion explaining the contours of both Turkmen and Afghan 
law.37  This summary will exclude the discussion relating to Turkmen law as outside the 
scope of the greater article. 
In summarizing Afghani law, at least five expert witnesses appeared (four 
testifying on Unocal’s behalf) to testify to the sum and substance of the territory’s law, its 
applicability, and understandability.38  Bridas’s expert, Dr. Mark Hoyle,39 an 
administrative law judge from London, testified that Afghani law was difficult to 
apprehend because of the few resources on the matter.40  Accordingly, Hoyle testified 
that in his opinion and “based on the Hanafi as it has been codified in the Afghan Civil 
Code and Commercial Code, a cause of action exists for interference with a contractual 
relationship.”41  In coming to his conclusion, Hoyle relied on articles from the Afghan 
Civil Code, and interpretations of Islamic law from Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab 
Emirates. 42
37 Id. 
38
 Rashid reports that at least nine experts testified. However, it appears four of those 
experts related Turkmen law rather than Afghani law. Rashid, supra note 4, at 179.  
39
 Hoyle has published one book relating to Islamic Commerce: MARK HOYLE, MIXED 
COURTS OF EGYPT (1991); he has published other books that address Islamic Legal 
concerns in the context of International law: THE MAREVA INJUNCTION AND RELATED 
ORDERS (3d ed. 1997) and THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2d Ed. 1985).  He is also 
co-founder and editor of the Arab Law Quarterly.   
40
 It is important to note that Hoyle’s testimony comports with Bridas Corp’s overall legal 
strategy -- that the Conflict of Law analysis should sway towards an application of Texas 
law because Afghani law was indeterminable.  See Bridas Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 899. 
41 See id. at 904-05.
42 Bridas Corp, 16 S.W.3d at 904.  
On the other side, Unocal (and its co-defendant Delta -- a Saudi Arabian subsidy 
of Unocal) presented four experts that convinced the court that not only was Afghani law 
ascertainable, but that it did not recognize a tort for interference with contractual 
relations.  Unocal’s first expert, Professor Ian Edge,43 testified that Afghanistan follows a 
purely non-secular form of Islamic law deriving from the Hanafi school of thought.  Edge 
testified that the sources of decision come from religious scholars not judges who 
interpret the two sources of Islamic law -- the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the Mejelle.44 He 
further testified that under these sources of law, Afghanistan courts would not recognize a 
tort for interference with contractual relations.45  In arriving at this conclusion, Edge 
noted that the Shari’a provides for recovery only where a physical injury has occurred to 
person or property. Edge’s conclusion that interference with a contractual relationship is 
not tangible or direct and is therefore incompensable was based on articles 89 and 1510 
of the Mejelle.46  Additionally because a harm cannot result from a lawful act, Bridas 
could have no cause of action in Afghanistan.  Unocal’s second and third witnesses, 
Muhammed Rostayee and Abdul Salam Azimi agreed with Edge’s conclusion that  the 
Afghan civil code affords no remedy for Bridas’s action.47
43 Id. at 903. Edge is a law professor at the University of London specializing in Islamic 
and Middle Eastern Law.  
44 Id. at 903.
45 Id.
46 Id. The Court of Appeals also cited in a footnote Civil Code article 787: “Action shall 
relate to the actor, not the commander, except when the actor is intimidated.  In actions, 
only complete aversion shall be recognized as credible force majeure.  The Court further 
noted that article 551 defined aversion as the “intimidation of a person, unreasonably for 
executing an action without consent whether it may be material or spiritual.”  Id at 903 
n.6. 
47
 The second witness presented by Unocal was Muhammed Roystayee, a lawyer licensed 
to practice law in Adghanistan.  He testified that “there is no mention of the [causes of 
action pled by Bridas] in the civil code and neither in the Shari’a law. Id. at 904.  
The fourth expert presented by Unocal was Dr. Frank Vogel.48  Vogel first 
testified that Bridas’s expert (Hoyle) used an inexact translation of the Afghan Civil Code 
was inexact.  He further stated the following in an effort to contextualize Islamic non-
recognition of non-direct torts:
One thinks, when one encounters anything like this, 
these torts specifically, if you encounter something in the 
translation that corresponds with these torts, you come up 
with absolutely nothing, not in any secondary works, not in 
anything that you have read in original works. So first, 
there is a presumption against such a tort you must admit. 
Then you think, well, might that be, because it is 
not likely that this situation has never arisen before.  And 
then you think, well, perhaps it contradicts basic principles 
and there is the principle that springs to mind that does 
stand in the way of this recognition of these torts that’s 
been often mentioned.  It is represented by Article 89 of the 
Mejelle and article 1510.  So this must be some part of the 
explanation as to why [these] torts are not recognized 
explicitly and that is, as it reads, article 89, “The judgment 
for an act is made to fall on the person who does it.  And it 
does not fall on the person who gives the order, as long as 
he does not compel the doing of the act.” This is one in the 
Mejelle and it appears in several others here, such as article 
1510: the order of a person is lawful in respect to his own 
property only.  Therefore , if someone says to another, 
“throw this property into the sea” and the person  who 
receives the order, throws it, knowing that the property 
belongs to someone else, the owner can enforce 
compensation for that property from the person who threw 
it.  Nothing is necessary for the person who gave the order, 
so far as he has not used force.   
The third witness presented by Unocal was Abdul Salam Azimi, a former law 
professor at Kabul University Law School.  Azimi testified that the Afghani courts are 
currently operating and that in those courts injuries would only be compensable if direct. 
Id. 
48
 Vogel is a Professor of Law at Harvard University School of Law specializing in 
Islamic Law, and is director of the Harvard Islamic Studies Center.  He has written 
substantially on the subject of Islamic Commerce, including: ISLAMIC LAW & LEGAL 
SYSTEMS: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA (Boston 2000); ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: 
RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN (1998); and ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GULF: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS, COMPARISON AND PREDICTION (1997).  
So the person who has ordered it offers no excuse 
for the person who does it.  The person who it is going to 
be held liable.  This law is religious law, and they feel that 
the person who makes the fateful step to do the wrongful 
thing had a point of decision, and he should have withheld 
the act.  
We may make a moral judgment somewhat 
differently.  But they have felt to accentuate the moral 
responsibility of the individual, this ought to be the rule.49
In receiving this testimony (particularly the testimony by Vogel and Edge), the Court 
decided that Afghanistan law was “readily and reliably ascertainable” and that the 
Afghan courts would not enforce a tort for tortious interference with a contract. 50
2. CPS International Inc. v. Dresser Industries Inc., 911 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
In 1978, CPS International (a Delaware Corporation) and a Saudi Arabian 
national named Abdullah Rushaid Al-Rushaid formed a Saudi Arabian Company named 
Creole Al-Rushaid, Ltd., with the purpose of conducting business in Saudi Arabia.  CPS 
International was a wholly owned subsidiary of Creole Production Services, a Delaware 
Corporation whose principle place of business is in Houston, Texas.   Creole Al-Rushaid 
was formed under Saudi Arabian law for the purpose of conducting operations in Saudi 
Arabia.  In 1983, CPS International and Al-Rushaid instituted an action in the Saudi 
courts to dissolve the corporation.51  However, after the process proved cumbersome, 
CPS International alleged that Al-Rushaid deliberately attempted to slow the process of 
dissolving the corporation.  CPS International further alleged that Al-Rushaid conspired 
with Dresser Industries to drive CPS International out of the Saudi Arabian market.52
49 Bridas Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 905.
50 Id. at 906. 
51 Id. at 21.
52 Id. 
A number of different suits in federal and Saudi Arabian courts finally culminated 
in a settlement between the parties.53 Nevertheless, CPS International and Creole brought 
suit in Texas State Court against Al-Rushaid and Dresser Industries alleging the same 
claims urged to the Saudi Arabian Courts.  The District court granted summary judgment 
against CPS and Creole finding that Saudi Arabian Law applied and did not recognize the 
plaintiffs’ claims.  
The appellate court reviewed the decision according to the standards accorded to 
summary judgment decisions.54   The Court faced the mixed question of addressing a 
foreign law as a mixture of fact and law.55  The Appellate Court’s decision treated the 
53
 In 1985, CPS brought a Federal Antitrust action against Dresser Industries and Al-
Rushaid asserting that the defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to drive CPS out of 
the Saudi Arabian market.  The Court eventually dismissed the matter holding that there 
was an insufficient impact on the U.S. Market to proceed as a Federal Antitrust matter. 
CPS, 911 S.W.2d at 21.  Before the court dismissed the matter, the CPS and Creole filed 
a second action in the same court alleging similar facts, and claiming that the effects were 
anti-competitive.  The Court again dismissed CPS’s action stating: “if there are any 
anticompetitive effects, surely they are in Saudi Arabia, where CARL (Creole Al-
Rushaid Ltd.) was eliminated as a competitor.  Id. Concurrently with the filing of its 
original suit, CPS also filed a matter in Saudi Arabian Court against Al-Rushaid for 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of confidential 
information, and conspiracy.  The claims were heard by a three judge panel that held that 
these matters were non-justicible under Saudi Arabian law, but, which went on to 
investigate alternative means to resolve the parties’ disputes. Id. Both sides agreed to 
settle the disputes with Al-Rushaid agreeing to cooperate in the Creole-Al- Rushaid 
dissolution, and CPS agreeing to drop the aforementioned federal suits.  CPS then 
brought the action currently under discussion in the Texas State District Court. 
54
 The standard of review considers whether the movant successfully carried his burden 
of proof at the trial level -- showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that 
judgment should be granted as a matter of law.  See id. citing Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 
819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991).  
55
 The court said that intuitively “the task of determining foreign law strikes us as a 
factual inquiry into the content or text of foreign rules of law.”  However, Texas Rules of 
Evidence art. 203 makes clear that the determination of the content of foreign law is a 
question of law for the court. CPS, 911 S.W.2d at 21. Thus, the Court rephrased its 
assessment as one not to determine whether the trial court properly found no factual 
application of Saudi Arabian law as a question of law, rather than a contestable issue of 
fact.  The Court accordingly considered the issues on two discreet planes: first, whether 
the manner in which the Al-Rushaid defendants competed with Creole-Al- Rushaid could 
have been determined by contract; 56 and second, whether Saudi Arabian law would 
matter at issue, as whether the court reached a proper legal conclusion regarding its 
content.  Id.
56
 Regarding the first issue, the court reviewed four different agreements executed 
between Al-Rushaid and Creole in the context of their business relationship.  Al-Rushaid 
and Dresser relied upon three writings which allude both directly and indirectly  to Saudi 
Arabian law being applicable to any dispute.The first such agreement relied upon by Al-
Rushaid and Dresser, what the Court describes as the Kriol Contract, included a provision 
that states: “if arbitration fails to settle the dispute the case will be taken to the committee 
of settling the Commercial disputes at Dammam; the contract continued stating that the 
company shall abide by all the rules and regulations existing in force in the kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia.  All provisions not stated in this contract will be governed by the code of 
the Companies Act.  
The Second agreement appeared in the By-laws of Creole-Al- Rushaid.  It 
provided that “if any difference or dispute shall arise between the parties as to the 
interpretation of the by-laws, or any other matter or thing arising therefrom or in 
connection therewith, then, upon either parties giving notice of difference or dispute to 
the other, the same shall be referred to arbitration the venue for which shall be the 
Committee for Settlement of Commercial disputes, Dhaharan, Saudi Arabia.  
The third contractual provision relied upon by the Al-Rushaid/ Dresser defendants 
appeared in the working agreement between the parties.  It stated that “Each director of 
[Creole Al-Rushaid Ltd.] will meet the responsibilities imposed on him by the laws of 
Saudi Arabia.  Creole agrees to manage the joint venture company in accordance with 
Saudi Arabian laws. … Any controversy or claim among the parties to this agreement 
arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be settled in accordance with the 
provision in the bylaws of [CARL] for the settlement of disputes. Id. 
On the other hand, the CPS and Creole parties claimed that these expressions 
cited by Al-Rushaid and Dresser were mere agreements to abide by Saudi Arabian law, 
not binding choice of law clauses.  CPS and Creole point to a fourth expression by the 
parties in the Technical Assistance Agreement, which provides: “Any controversy, 
dispute, or question arising out of, or in connection with, or in relation to this Agreeement 
or its interpretation, performance, or nonperformance or any breach thereof shall be 
determined in accordance with the Laws of the United States of America. 
The court ultimately agreed with the CPS Creole parties that the choice of law 
provision in the Technical Assistance Contract was the only genuine choice of law 
provision.  In doing so the court allowed the contract claims to proceed under U.S. law.  
recognize a tort for interference with a contract.  We will turn attention only to the second 
as relevant to our discussion, as only the later addresses the application of Islamic law.   
  The Court’s assessment of which law governs the tort claims brought by CPS 
and Creole centered around the Restatement (Second) on Conflicts of Laws.  After 
outlining the pertinent sections of the Restatement, the Court turned to its analysis.  First, 
the court found that the alleged injury occurred in Saudi Arabia: the Court noted that at 
the bottom of Plaintiffs’ claims were the actions by Dresser to ‘“wrest field servicing 
business in Saudi Arabia’ away from Creole-Al- Rushaid.  The Court pertinently 
determined that the financial harm done to Creole-Al- Rushaid, though felt in Texas, 
originated from actions occurring in Saudi Arabia.  Next, the Court found that the injury 
situs was in Saudi Arabia stating that though directed from Texas, the actions occurred in 
Saudi Arabia.  Third, the Court noted that none of the nine litigants were Texas 
Corporations with only two even holding offices in Texas; the court noted that the fact 
that five of the nine litigants were Saudi Arabian, that this factor weighed against the 
application of Texas law. A final review of the relationships of the parties also pointed to 
the application of Saudi Arabian law.57
Thus, the court came to consider whether Saudi Arabia would allow for the tort of 
interference with a contractual relationship.  CPS International and Creole produced 
William Van Orden Gnichtel,58 who testified that Saudi Arabia would recognize a claim 
for tortious interference with a contract.  He said: “I would set aside or disregard the 
nomenclature and get to the essence, and the essence is basically that if one does a wrong 
57 Id. at 29-30. 
58
 Apparently, Van Orden Gnichtel’s testimony regarding Saudi Arabian law was based 
on conversations with a colleague, who unlike Gnichtel, is licensed as a Saudi Arabian 
lawyer. 
to another he will be required to compensate the wronged party.”59  The court found Van 
Orden Gnichtel’s testimony to be fatal because it only considered a general principle 
instead of the actual conduct in the case.60
Al-Rushaid and Dresser presented expert testimony from Joseph Saba, who 
besides being more precise about Saudi Arabian Law, addressed the specifics of the 
matter.  He testified: 
“The American concept of Tortious interference 
with a contract is not among the acts giving rise to a cause 
of action in Saudi Arabia.  The nonexistence of such a 
cause of action is consistent, inter alia, with the Hanbali 
School’s emphasis on individual free will and 
responsibility.  If a person does not perform his contractual 
obligations or does not enter into a contract or breaches his 
duties to another, such conduct is his own responsibility, 
not that of anyone else. Even if another person persuades, 
requests or otherwise influences such conduct, that other 
person is not liable in a civil action for monetary payments 
to the plaintiff, in the absence of direct contractual 
obligation running from that other person to the plaintiff.61
Saba continued by addressing a statement by Van Orden Gnichtel that the “Shari’a” 
recognizes civil liability for wrongful acts resulting in damages… and is not dependant 
on specific contractual arrangements or specific regulations promulgated by 
government.”62 Saba said that though Van Orden Gnichtel’s interpretation is correct 
when applied to Saudi Arabian law, it would be incorrect to apply this premise across the 
gamit of American Tort claims.  He said: 
The Saudi scope of liability of one private party to another 
does not encompass all acts which American law might 
consider to be wrongful.... Finally, while the existence of 
59 Id. at 31.
60 Id. at 31. 
61 Id. at 32. 
62 Id. 
liability is not necessarily dependent upon "specific 
contractual arrangements or specific regulations," the 
conduct in question still must lie within an appropriate 
category of actionable conduct under Saudi Arabia's strict 
construction of the Shari'a. As stated above, based upon my 
review of the pleadings in this case, the claims against 
Dresser in this suit do not fit within such a category. There 
is no nexus under Saudi law between Dresser and the 
plaintiffs giving the plaintiffs the cause of action they 
assert.63
On subsequent cross examination, CPS and Creole’s expert admitted that as applied, 
Saudi Arabian law would not recognize a claim against a third party for tortious 
interference with a contract.  
The court subsequently addressed other issues of fiduciary duty, misappropriation 
of trade secrets, and conspiracy.  However, CPS and Creole failed to posit arguments to 
the court specifically relating to these claims.  Accordingly, their tort claims were 
dismissed.  
3. Saudi Basic Oil Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical, 866 A.2d 1 
(Del. 2005).
In 2004, the Delaware Supreme Court heard the matter of Saudi Basic Industries 
Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co. Inc.64 In Saudi Basic, a Saudi Arabian partner 
(Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (“SABIC”) in a joint venture with Mobil Yanbu 
63 Id. at 32. 
64
 866 A.2d 1 (Del. 2005).  This matter actually maintains two underlying cases as its 
procedural history.  In 2002, SABIC brought an action against ExxonMobil in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking a declaratory judgment that 
ExxonMobil had used technology previously developed for the Joint ventures to obtain 
proprietary information from SABIC.  They further sought a judgment declaring that the 
Exxon/SABIC venture owned the patents and seeking an injunction requiring 
ExxonMobil to transfer them to the venture.  During the discovery phase of the trial, 
SABIC agreed to a consent order that would have required SABIC to respond to the 
overcharge allegations.   See Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 194 F.Supp. 
2d 378, 384 (D.N.J. 2002).  Instead of responding, SABIC filed the Delaware Superior 
Court matter. 866 A.2d at  10 n.7. 
Petrochemical Co. Inc. (“Mobil”) and Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc. (“Exxon”) sought to 
overturn a Superior Court order denying SABIC’s request for judgment that it did not 
overcharge Mobil and Exxon for technologies licensed from a third party.  Mobil and 
Exxon countersued SABIC, and was awarded US$220,238,108 and US$196,642,656 
respectively.65
In 1980, SABIC, a Saudi Arabian Corporation, created joint ventures with Mobil 
and Exxon to manufacture polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. The Joint ventures carefully 
negotiated their contract agreements, and as the Court says included a requirement that 
the profits enjoyed by each joint venture partner would be limited to the profits earned by 
the joint venture -- a provision the court deemed critical to its analysis.66  In particular, 
the joint venture agreement provided: “To the extent either Partner, or any affiliate 
thereof, procures patents, processes, and other licensing rights of third parties, and 
sublicenses such rights to the partnership, it shall not receive any remuneration other than 
actual cost incurred in acquiring and sublicensing such right.”67
In order to produce Polyethylene, Mobil and SABIC had to license technology it 
did not own.68  In Spring 1980, SABIC informed Mobil that it would license the 
technology directly from Union Carbide Corporation (“UCC”) and then sublicense the 
65 Id. at 7. 
66 Id. at 8. 
67 Id. at 8.  The text of the Exxon venture differed slightly, reading: “Patents, Processes, 
and other licensing rights of third parties which require the payment of royalties, rentals 
and other remuneration to such third parties shall be paid by the partnership  against 
appropriate invoices.  To the extent either partner or any Affiliate thereof procure such 
rights and sublicenses for the Partnership, it shall not receive any remuneration other than 
actual cost disbursed in acquiring such license.”  Id. 
68 Id. at 8. 
technology to the joint venture;69 in making this overture, SABIC assured Mobil that it 
would comply with the contractual requirements of passing on costs “dollar for dollar.”70
Nevertheless, over the following two decades SABIC marked up the costs before passing 
them on to the joint venture for payment -- with Mobil and Exxon oblivious to the mark-
up in costs.71
In June 1987, spurred by poor conditions in the polyethylene market, UCC agreed 
to reduce its licensing royalties due, including the amount due from SABIC.  At the same 
time, Exxon and Mobil amended their joint ventures with SABIC to account for the 
adjusted royalty fees.  However, unbeknownst to Mobil or Exxon, SABIC had negotiated 
for itself a royalty reduction rate that was significantly larger than the reductions in either 
the Mobil or Exxon contracts.72
In 2000, ExxonMobil, now merged, discovered the overcharges.73  SABIC and 
the Saudi Taxing Authority came into dispute about the royalties paid by SABIC to UCC 
under the SABIC/UCC agreement; the Saudi Government determined that those 
payments were taxable.  The decision prompted SABIC to send letters to the joint 
ventures explaining the tax dispute and demanding their contribution to the tax.  While 
69
 In 1980, UCC and SABIC executed a agreement granting SABIC an exclusive license 
to the Unipol Technology within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  Mobil and Exxon were 
not permitted to attend the meeting between UCC and SABIC.  Id. 
70 Id. 
71
 The Court noted that SABIC’s motives appear related to insuring any losses the joint 
venture may suffer, as they accounted for the increase in the profit margin of the 
corporation.  Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
verifying the accuracy of the SABIC indemnification demand, ExxonMobil discovered 
for the first time that SABIC had been overcharging the ventures.74
In the trial court, both sides agreed that Saudi Arabian substantive law applied to 
the dispute.  Specifically, the Court found that SABIC was liable for the Saudi tort of 
ghasb or usurpation.75  SABIC argued that the conclusion that ghasb had been committed 
was inappropriate because SABIC did not act forcefully and with the victim’s 
knowledge.  Concretely, SABIC’s argument was that because it had acted surreptiously 
and without the victim’s knowledge, then Ghasb is simply inapplicable to the current 
dispute.  Indeed, SABIC stated that all ExxonMobil proved was that SABIC had engaged 
in “secret conduct based on the color of right.”76 SABIC’s claims can be reduced to three  
discreet questions by the Court: first that to commit ghasb under Saudi Arabian law, 
ExxonMobil was required to establish, but failed to establish “an open and obvious taking 
that is intentional and without any color of right;” second, that no Saudi Court would 
have awarded enhanced damages in a contract case such as this one; and third that the 
trial court, though purporting to employ the methodology that a Saudi Judge would 
employ (Ijtihad) in fact only employed ijtihad as a post hoc rationalization for foreign 
law rulings that were “arbitrary and unprincipled.”77
74 Id. 
75
 Other issues were presented for review, including whether the trial court’s evidentiary 
rulings were accurate, whether the Delaware borrowing statute applied, and the 
contractual construction of claims.  This analysis only focuses on the Ghasb claims as 
relevant to Islamic law.  Id. at 11-30. 
76 Id. at 29. 
77 Id. 
Addressing the question of ijtihad first, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the 
Trial Court’s reasoning and method.78   The Court began by defining the religious aspects 
of Saudi Arabian law, flowing from the Hanbali school.  Dr. Vogel testified that Saudi 
Judges “hew conservatively to the Hanbali school.”79  The Court also noted the 
differences between Saudi Arabian law and that of Common Law countries, specifically, 
that Islamic countries do not embrace precedent or stare decisis in the same way as 
western courts do; and the relative unavailability of law reports to the public.80  From this 
beginning the Supreme Court cited the trial judge’s rationale in applying Islamic law:
SABIC’s arguments ignore the simple truth that the 
circumstances under which Ghasb damages are available 
under Saudi law are not well known, much less defined, 
because Saudi law is not based on precedent or stare 
decisis.  Contrary to the implication of SABIC’s briefing on 
this issue, the reality is that one cannot simply consult a 
statute book or a case reporter to find the elements of, or 
damages available for the Saudi law tort of Ghasb.  Nor can 
one point to one definition of, or a given set of 
circumstances giving rise to, Ghasb.  To illustrate the 
extreme difficulty of discerning and interpreting Saudi law, 
the Court notes that none of the Saudi law experts who 
testified agreed on the proper elements of Ghasb… Finally, 
because Saudi law decisions are not published, even if the 
decisions had precedential value (which all the experts 
agree they do not) the Court could not look to decisions of 
Saudi judges to determine the proper elements or define the 
recoverable damages.81
The Supreme Court in affirming this reasoning by the Superior Court Judge, noted that 
judges in Saudi Arabia must “first and last navigate within the boundaries” of the Hanbali 
School’s authoritative works, including works by Mansur-al-Bahuti, a 17th century 
78 Id. at 30
79 Id. at 30 n. 72.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 31. 
scholar, as well as the works of Ibn Qudama and Al Maqdisi.82  The Court, noting 
testimony from Professor Hallaq that each time a Saudi law Judge exercises Ijtihad, “it is 
basically his best … effort to find what is the right thing to do,”83 affirmed the trial 
judge’s rationale as “doing the best it could to reach the right result.”  
In coming to its conclusions, the trial judge heard evidence from four Saudi law 
experts retained by the parties, as well as its own expert when conflict between the expert 
opinions was apparent.    The Court particularly noted the contradiction between the 
position submitted by SABIC expert Dr. Vogel that the Court could not credibly engage 
in the ijtihad process.  The court said in response:
According to Dr. Vogel, ijtihad requires for its credibility 
qualification which on the very face of things, neither 
Professor Hallaq, myself or, with respect, any U.S. Court 
possesses.  If Dr. Vogel is correct, then why did SABIC 
choose to file this dispute in a United States Court. If Dr. 
Vogel is correct that neither he, nor Dr. Hallaq possess the 
qualifications to engage in the ijtihad process, then what 
Saudi law “expert” would be able to assist this United 
States court in determining the applicable Saudi law. 84
On this view, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s determinations under ijtihad.  
Turning to the specific issue of Ghasb, the Court determined that “in order to 
establish a claim for usurpation, ExxonMobil must show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that SABIC wrongfully exercised ownership or possessor rights over the 
property of another without consent, “which means with blatant or reckless disregard for 
those property rights.  The conduct need not be intentional.” 85  In coming to this 
82 Id. at 31. 
83
 Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 2003 WL 22016843, at *2 n. 8.  
84 Id.  The Court also noted the contradiction of SABIC posing this argument only after 
receiving a unfavorable judgment. 
85 Id. at 33.
definition, the trial court rejected SABIC’s argument that Ghasb must include elements 
of being open and notorious as well as intentional without color of right.  The court relied 
upon experts that said the Hanbali’s school requires no such elements for the tort.  For 
example Dr. Wolfson testified that there is “no single binding definition of Ghasb, but 
rather a range of possibilities.86 The Court specifically rejected Dr. Vogel’s definition of 
Ghasb, who suggested that openness and intentional conduct were required. 87 Instead, 
the court embraced the testimony of Dr. Wolfson, who testified that the most revered 
Hanbali scholars do not include openness or intention in their definition of Ghasb.88  In 
turn, Hallaq testified that the victim does not need to know he was a victim to be 
considered a victim of Ghasb.  On this basis, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed 
the lower court ruling. 
Regarding the practice (or non-practice) of awarding enhanced damages by Saudi 
Courts, the trial judge said:
[S]imply because SABIC's expert is unable to name a case 
in which a Saudi judge awarded damages for usurpation is 
of little import to this Court considering that Saudi law 
does not recognize stare decisis and Saudi law opinions are 
not published. To say that usurpation damages are "highly 
unusual" presumes that there are Saudi law cases where 
judges refuse to award damages for usurpation even when 
the elements have been clearly established. No such case 
law was provided to the Court, nor could it be, given the 
nuances of the Saudi law system. Moreover, whether a 
86 Id. at 33. 
87 Id. The Court does not find Dr. Vogel's latest definition of ghasb persuasive. Having 
had the opportunity to watch Dr. Vogel testify, observe his demeanor on the witness 
stand when his interpretation of Saudi law was challenged, and review his latest affidavit 
as well as his prior affidavits and deposition testimony, the Court finds he has become (or 
been exposed as) more of an advocate than an objective scholar of Islamic law. His 
relentless attacks on Dr. Hallaq's qualifications and expertise further undermine his 
credibility in the Court's eye. The Court is concerned about Dr. Vogel's objectivity.
88 Id. at 33-34. 
form of damages is "unprecedented" is also irrelevant if 
such damages are available according to the authoritative 
Hanbali texts which are the primary works consulted by 
Saudi judges to determine the law applicable to the type of 
dispute raised in this case.89
The Court also noted that Dr. Wolfson testified that in tort actions in the Hanbali school, 
damages, such as those awarded in this case, are not so irregular as to be incorrect.90
4. Blackstone v. Aramco Services Co., No. 80-44642, 1991 WL 63630 (Tex. Ct. App. 
4/25/1991).
In 1964 Arabian American Oil Co. (“ARAMCO”) hired Robert E. Blackstone to 
work in Saudi Arabia as a waterwell maintenance manager.  In 1979, ARAMCO 
conducted an internal investigation to determine the validity of allegations that five senior 
managers, including Blackstone, received favors from contractors or had improperly 
approved invoices for subcontractors.91  Blackstone claimed that ARAMCO investigators 
were threatening him, and he returned to Texas.  Blackstone was allegedly forced to take 
early retirement, and suffered from severe mental and emotional injuries.92
Blackstone in 1980 filed suit against ARAMCO alleging improper termination, 
slander, negligence, false imprisonment, assault, and infliction of emotional distress.  
Among the remedies sought by Blackstone included that of taz’ir - a lashing of the 
tortfeasor by the state.  After deciding whether Saudi law applied, the Court turned to 
whether Saudi law recognized the torts Blackstone alleged.  
The Court initially noted that: 
89 Id. at 35. 
90 Id. 
91
 Blackstone, 1991 WL 63630, at *1.  
92 Id. at *2. 
the Shari’a does not permit actions for damages of a moral 
or emotional nature.  Serious bodily injury, short of death 
gives the victim the right to recover money damages 
determined according to the importance of the injured 
organ or the seriousness of the wound inflicted. Anything 
short of physical injury or damage to a specific part of the 
body that is inflicted by some form of physical contact does 
not give rise to compensable claims for damages under 
Shari’a, but may subject the tortfeasor to the criminal 
sanction of Ta’zir.93
Finding that Blackstone exhibited no physical injuries, the court denied his contention 
that Saudi Law would afford a remedy for his claims.94 Finally the court noted that 
Blackstone’s claim for imprisonment or lashings are outside the jurisdictional scope of 
the Courts. The Court noted that Taz’ir is a penal claim and therefore outside the 
boundaries of the district civil court.95
5. Rhodes v. ITT Sheraton Corp, No. Civ. A. 97-4530-B, 1999 WL 26874; 9 Mass. L. 
Rptr. 355 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1/15/1999). 
In 1994, Emma Louise Rhodes was injured while a guest at the Sheraton Jeddah 
Hotel and Villas (“Jeddah”) in Saudi Arabia.96   Rhodes was a British national; the 
defendants, all Massachusetts citizens, were ITT Sheraton Corp (“ITT”), Sheraton 
International Inc., (“International”), Sheraton Overseas Management Corporation 
(“Overseas”), Sheraton Middle East Management Corp. (“Middle East”), and John 
Veelenturf, Vice President of ITT and director of fire, life safety and environment. 
Rhodes did not name as defendants Jeddah nor its Saudi Arabian owner Saudi Brothers 
93 Id. at *3.
94
 Blackstone claimed that his injuries included “depression, anxiety, tension, insomnia, 
anorexia, nervous eating, and seclusiveness.” Id. 
95 Id. at *5. 
96 Rhodes, 1999 WL 26874, at *1. 
Commercial Company (“Saudi Brothers”).97  Under a contractual arrangement between 
Saudi Brothers and Middle East Management Corp. (“Middle East”) Middle East 
operates the Sheraton Jeddah for Saudi Brothers.98   Middle East is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of ITT.99  ITT also owns International, which granted Saudi Brothers a license 
to use Sheraton trademarks.100 ITT also owns Overseas.101
Rhodes, while staying at Jeddah injured her spinal cord while diving into the 
water.102  The resort complex encompassed a beach, a large concrete wharf, a wooden 
platform or jetty and a lagoon.103  Coral reef stretched underneath the jetty and around the 
edge of the lagoon.104  Rhodes struck her head on the Coral when she dove into the 
lagoon from the Jetty.105  She lay in the water, face down and unable to move until she 
was pulled out and taken to a nearby hospital.106  Rhodes suffered a high level spinal 
injury and spent three months in a Saudi Hospital where she underwent surgery to fuse 
her spine.107  As a result of her injuries, Rhodes is a tetraplegic, unable to move her left 
arm, either of her legs, and has limited function of the right arm.108
The Massachusetts Superior Court reviewed whether an adequate alternative forum 
existed for Ms. Rhodes claims and whether the matter should be transferred.  On the first 
issue, the court considered whether the Saudi Arabian Courts were adequate alternative 
97 Id. at *1 & 1 n. 2. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id.
102 Id. at *1. 
103 Id. 
104 Id 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
forums.  The court noted that the plaintiff would encounter significant “procedural 
disadvantages” if the matter was to proceed in Saudi Arabian courts.109  On the testimony 
of Frank Vogel,110 the court noted that the Plaintiff would not be entitled to testify 
herself.111  Vogel testified that “all parties are presumed to be prejudiced in favor of 
themselves  and therefore are not considered to be reliable witnesses.”112  Vogel noted 
that the plaintiff would be entitled to submit written assertions;113 but on the commentary 
of Peter Sloane, the court concluded that this testimony is somewhat disfavored to oral 
testimony.114  The court also noted the lack of pre-trial discovery procedures, the lack of 
non-uniform rules of procedure in Saudi Courts, no jurisprudential precedent, and the 
biases against women as substantial procedural hurdles presented to the plaintiff.115
Then, the Court noted that the public policy factors recommended trying the case in 
Massachusetts.  Among the rationale used was that Massachusetts law seemed to be more 
“equitable” to the claims of the plaintiff.  The Court said:
For example, the better rule of law in a tort case probably 
would be that of Massachusetts. Saudi tort law is 
"subsumed under private actions and do[es] not exist as a 
distinct and highly developed field of law." Brand, supra at 
28. Given the theory of liability in this case, it also is 
significant that Saudi law does not recognize agency within 
the concept of torts. Id. (general Islamic philosophy is that 
one is always responsible for one's own acts). Moreover, 
consequential, indirect, and speculative damages generally 
are viewed as nonrecoverable through a Saudi court. Turck, 
supra at 441. If she establishes defendants' liability, 
109 Id. at *2. 
110 See supra note ___.  
111 Rhodes, 1999 WL 26874 at *2. 
112 Id. at *2. 
113 Id. at *2. 
114 Id. citing Peter B. Sloane, The Status of Islamic Law in the Modern Commercial 
World, 22 INT’L L. 743, 751 (1988).  
115 Id. 
plaintiff could only expect to recover actual medical 
expenses and a fraction of her "diyah," which is a fixed 
amount of compensation for personal injury.116
On the basis of this discussion, the trial court ruled that the Saudi forum was not 
appropriate for plaintiff’s claims.117
6. Chadwick v. Arabian American Oil Co., 656 F.Supp. 857 (D. Del. 1987).  
In 1987, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware heard claims by Reed 
Chadwick, an employee of an independent contractor hired to do work in Saudi 
Arabia.118  Chadwick claimed that while working in Saudi Arabia, he sought medical 
attention from a doctor retained by the Arabian American Oil Co. (“Arabia Oil”), the 
employer of Chadwick’s independent contractor.119  The doctor originally diagnosed 
Chadwick’s problem as gas, and provided him with Antacid treatments.120  A year later, 
Chadwick, still complaining of the same stomach pains, had an upper GI done by a 
different doctor retained by Arabia Oil who diagnosed the problem as a duodenal ulcer.121
Later, after returning to the United States, Chadwick was diagnosed by a U.S. doctor has 
having a malignant stomach tumor.122  As a result, his entire stomach, spleen, and a 
portion of his liver and pancreas were removed; he was unable to return to work.123
After deciding that Saudi Arabian law should apply to this dispute, the Court held 
that Chadwick could not state a claim for relief against Arabian Oil.  The Court held that 
116 Id. at *5.  
117 Id. 
118 Chadwick, 956 F. Supp. At 809. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 859.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
Saudi law does not recognize vicarious liability.124  The Court stated that under Saudi 
Arabian law, “vicarious liability is not recognized unless it is proven that an actor’s free 
will is obliterated by the person directing the actor to act.”125  The Court continued, “The 
Shari’a, the common law of Saudi Arabia, ‘has a strict rule that responsibility for human 
action is individual and not vicarious.’”126 Thus the court held that Chadwick, to the 
extent that he had a claim, had to proceed against the Saudi doctors, not Arabian Oil.  
7. National Group for Communications and Computers v. Lucent Technologies 
International, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D.N.J. 2004).  
In 2004, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey heard claims for 
breach of contract by the National Group for Communications and Computers Ltd. 
(“NGCC”) against Lucent Technologies Inc. (“Lucent”).127  The magistrate ordered the 
parties to submit evidence relating to Saudi Arabian law, as both parties agreed that 
Saudi Arabian law governed the dispute.  NGCC sued Lucent for breach of contract 
relating to the installation of pay phone and emergency phone stations along highways in 
Saudi Arabia.  The total amount of the contract was $75,460,902.  NGCC sought 
damages in excess of $92,319,579, which included claims for future loss and unearned 
profits.128
The Court began its analysis of Saudi law by noting the differences between it and 
U.S. law.  The Court came to the conclusion that the religious practices of Islam 
permeates every aspect of life in Saudi Arabia, most pertinently Contract disputes.  The 
124 Id. at 861.  
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 NGCC, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 290.   
128 Id. 
Court, relying on Frank Vogel,129 noted that the Saudi Arabia legal system is governed 
exclusively by Shari’a.130   The Court then said “ in fact, there are not “laws” in Saudi 
Arabia other than Islamic law, and any supplemental rules promulgated by the Saudi 
government are actually considered regulations known as “Nizam.”131  The Court noted 
that these regulations are valid only to the extent that they are consistent with Shari’a.   
The Court then went on to define the sources of Shari’a:
The Shari'a is the product of several interrelated 
sources of religious authority. (Frank E. Vogel Tr. 143: 21-
22; William M. Ballntyne Tr. 228:18- 19; Mujahid M. Al-
Sawwaf Tr. 418: 17-21). The doctrines comprising Shari'a 
are derived primarily from the Qur'an, the "Book of God." 
The Qur'an is considered the word of God as received by 
the Prophet Muhammed. Because the Qur'an commands 
adherents of Islam to obey the Prophet, the recorded 
examples of the acts and words of Muhammed, known as 
the "Sunnah," constitute an additional integral part of the 
Shari'a. (Vogel Tr. 143-44: 20-1). In the centuries since the 
founding of Islam, Islamic religious-legal scholars qualified 
to interpret the scriptural sources have produced opinions 
known as "fiqh." A complete understanding of the Shari'a 
in Saudi Arabia today also requires reference to any 
relevant fiqh for guidance. There are four schools of Shari'a 
law, each of which interprets Islamic doctrine somewhat 
differently. The predominant school followed in the courts 
of Saudi Arabia is known as the "Hanbali" school.132
When a Saudi Arabian judge, known as a "qadi," attempts 
to resolve disputes, his decision must be in accordance with 
the Shari'a. Therefore, he will turn to the aforementioned
Qur'an, the Sunnah, and fiqh to guide his legal 
determination. Saudi Arabian judges are not bound by 
judicial precedent (in fact, Saudi Arabian judicial opinions 
are not published) and the concept of stare decisis does not 
exist. (Vogel Tr. 143:2-4; Ballantyne Tr. 260-61:25- 1). 
129 See supra note ____. 
130 Id. at 294.  
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 295 citing FRANK VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW & LEGAL SYSTEM 5 (2000); FRANK 
VOGEL & SAMUEL HAYES, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE 50-51 (1991).  
Instead, judges "must strive for the divine truth for each 
case that confronts him, without being bound by past 
opinions, even his own. Truth is the ultimate precedent, to 
which one must return once it is revealed."133
Generally speaking, the Saudi Arabian legal structure is 
highly traditional and judges strictly apply classical Islamic 
law. In contrast to other Islamic countries that have adapted 
religious tenets to meet modern demands, in Saudi Arabia, 
Shari'a remains free of compromising reforms. (Vogel Tr. 
166:14-25). The Board of Grievances too is very 
conservative in its interpretation of commercial and 
contract law. (Vogel Tr. 163:10-11). As one author noted, 
"commercial jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia remains 
marked by a conservative fiqh orientation, reflecting the 
shari'a educations of the judges.... [W]henever the 
expectations of international commerce conflict with fixed 
standards of the old Hanbali law, it is the former that gives 
way."134
A key doctrine within the Shari'a is the prohibition on 
"gharar," meaning risk or uncertainty. Gharar is absolutely 
repugnant to Islamic law. (Vogel Tr. 154-55:16-9). Future 
activity is deemed gharar because it is uncertain to anyone 
except for God. One of the consequences of this categorical 
rejection of gharar is that Saudi Arabian courts will not 
enforce the sale of anything uncertain or unknown. The 
object of a contract must be certain and defined and in 
existence. Several historical accounts of the acts and 
statements of the Prophet Muhammed, known as "hadith," 
are instructive on this issue: 
Do not buy fish in the sea, for it is gharar. The Prophet 
forbade sale of what is in the wombs, sale of the contents of 
the udders, sale of a slave when he is runaway ... The 
Messenger of God forbade the [sale of] the copulation of 
the stallion. He who purchases food shall not sell it until he 
weighs it.135
One scholar expounded upon the implications that the 
prohibition of gharar has in producing differing 
133 Id citing VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE at 15.
134 Id. citing VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEMS at 305. 
135 Id. citing Frank E. Vogel, The Contract Law of Islam and of the Arab Middle East, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 52 (Draft September 1, 2003).
understandings of contractual obligations under Western 
and Islamic law: In English law the sanctity of contract 
means that the promise endures despite the normal 
vicissitudes of fortune. It is right that the promise should be 
kept 'for better or for worse', 'through thick and thin', 
because this in line with the popular belief that tenacity of 
purpose to some degree controls events and that the human 
will determines the future. The promise must dominate the 
circumstances. For Islam precisely the converse is true. 
Circumstances dominate the promise. Future circumstances 
are neither predictable nor controllable but lie entirely in 
the hands of the Almighty.... If the tide of affairs turns then 
the promise naturally floats out with it.136
After this extensive discussion of Islamic law, the court then proceeded to the questions 
underlying this dispute.  The Court noted that under Saudi Arabian law, damages 
available for breach of contract are generally limited to those losses which are actual and 
direct.137  Further, “Saudi law will not allow damages which are ascertainable only means 
involving speculation, contingencies, uncertainties or indeterminacy.”138  Thus, under the 
prohibition against Gharar, the Court will not allow expectation damages to be heard.139
Additionally, under the same prohibition, Saudi law would not allow damages for lost 
profits, unrealized gains or future profits.  
Plaintiff, whose expert was Frank Vogel, presented evidence that “higher 
valuations of damages are possible as long as the future event is not an explicit condition 
of the contract, and that uncertainty that is subsumed within a larger entity, such as a 
corporation, would be upheld , and that it is only when gharar inheres within a separate 
entity is it forbidden.”140 The court simply rejected this line of argument.  Accordingly, 
136 Id. citing BALLANTYNE, ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES ON ARAB LAWS 274. 
137 Id. at 298. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 298. 
the Court limited the potential claims of the plaintiff to those damages actually suffered 
by NGCC, exclusive of any future or uncertain amounts.141
PART TWO 
CATEGORIZING JUDICIAL APPROACHES
As described above, American Courts reach questions of Islamic substance 
through three cognative stages: (1) recognition; (2) assimilation; and (3) response.  
Courts first attempt to recognize the issues that are involved, the law applicable and the 
appropriate basis to determine the issues.  Next, the courts begin to assimilate the matters 
to determine what response they should make.  Finally, they formulate their response, 
either in terms of their own jurisprudence or in terms of a compromised understanding.  
This part categorizes the seven courts described in part one as responding to the 
propositions presented by Islamic law with either procedural distance (formalism), 
interpretive bias, or transliteration.  
a. Formalistic Responses to Islam
Formalism is a posture of the court to divorce itself from the facts and deal strictly 
with the law.142  Thus, the court, coldly and without regard to emerging patterns simply 
applies the law.  The formalistic court does not see itself making policy; rather, its 
foremost goal is to “apply” the law to the cold set of facts before it.  
Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp. provides a nice illustration. 143  The Bridas 
litigation resulted from contracts between Bridas Corp. and the governments of 
Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, and Bridas’s allegations that Unocal Corp. tortiously 
141 Id. 
142
 Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2069-70 
(1995).  
143
 16 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). 
interfered with those agreements.144 The Texas Appellate court reviewed the question 
whether the tort interference with a contractual relationship would be allowed under 
Afghani law. 145 Recall the Court’s citation of Frank Vogel’s testimony, which it found
most persuasive: 
One thinks, when one encounters anything like this, these 
torts specifically, if you encounter something in the 
translation that corresponds with these torts, you come up 
with absolutely nothing, not in any secondary works, not in 
anything that you have read in original works. So first, 
there is a presumption against such a tort you must admit. 
Then you think, well, might that be, because it is not likely 
that this situation has never arisen before.  And then you 
think, well, perhaps it contradicts basic principles and there 
is the principle that springs to mind that does stand in the 
way of this recognition of these torts that’s been often 
mentioned.  It is represented by Article 89 of the Mejelle 
and article 1510.  So this must be some part of the 
explanation as to why [these] torts are not recognized 
explicitly and that is, as it reads, article 89, “The judgment 
for an act is made to fall on the person who does it.  And it 
does not fall on the person who gives the order, as long as 
he does not compel the doing of the act.”146
In receiving this testimony, the Court decided that Afghanistan law was “readily and 
reliably ascertainable” and that the Afghan courts would not enforce a tort for tortious 
interference with a contract. 147  The Court’s approach was to use law and law alone to 
come to this result -- a benchmark of formalism.   Succinctly, the Court’s analysis 
proceeded: (1) Afghani law is readily ascertainable to conclude this result; (2) there is no 
tort concept of interference with a contract within Afghani law; and (3) principles derived 
144 Bridas, 16 S.W.3d at 905. For further detail in understanding the Bridas case, see 
AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL, AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL 
ASIA 158 (2000)
145 Id. 
146 Bridas Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 905.
147 Id. at 906. 
from Afghani law would suggest that there is no similar cause of action.  The process is 
of survey, elimination, and distinction, without much regard to assimilating concepts or 
even understanding differences.  Notably, the Court only considered Islamic law to the 
extent necessary to determine whether the issue was justicible in its own forum. 
b. Interpretive Approach
A second approach by the courts surveyed is an interpretive approach. This 
approach is characterized by the opinion in Rhodes v. ITT Sheraton Corp. 148  Recall the 
threshold question as framed by the Massachusetts Superior Court -- whether an adequate 
alternative forum existed for Ms. Rhodes claims and whether the matter should be 
transferred.  On the first issue, the court considered whether the Saudi Arabian Courts 
were adequate alternative forums.  The court noted that the plaintiff would encounter 
significant “procedural disadvantages” if the matter was to proceed in Saudi Arabian 
courts.149  On the testimony of Frank Vogel,150 the court noted that the Plaintiff would not 
be entitled to testify herself.151  Vogel testified that “all parties are presumed to be 
prejudiced in favor of themselves and therefore are not considered to be reliable 
witnesses.”152  Vogel noted that the plaintiff would be entitled to submit written 
assertions;153 but on the commentary of Peter Sloane, the court concluded that this 
testimony is somewhat disfavored to oral testimony.154  From this, the court perceived a 
lack of pre-trial discovery procedures, the lack of non-uniform rules of procedure in 
148 Rhodes, 1999 WL 26874, at *1. 
149 Id. at *2. 
150 See supra note ___.  
151 Rhodes, 1999 WL 26874 at *2. 
152 Id. at *2. 
153 Id. at *2. 
154 Id. citing Peter B. Sloane, The Status of Islamic Law in the Modern Commercial 
World, 22 INT’L L. 743, 751 (1988).  
Saudi Courts, no jurisprudential precedent, and the biases against women as substantial 
procedural hurdles presented to the plaintiff.155
Then, the Court noted that the public policy factors recommended trying the case in 
Massachusetts.  Among the rationale used was that Massachusetts law seemed to be more 
“equitable” to the claims of the plaintiff.  The Court said:
For example, the better rule of law in a tort case probably 
would be that of Massachusetts. Saudi tort law is 
"subsumed under private actions and do[es] not exist as a 
distinct and highly developed field of law." Brand, supra at 
28. Given the theory of liability in this case, it also is 
significant that Saudi law does not recognize agency within 
the concept of torts. Id. (general Islamic philosophy is that 
one is always responsible for one's own acts). Moreover, 
consequential, indirect, and speculative damages generally 
are viewed as nonrecoverable through a Saudi court. Turck, 
supra at 441. If she establishes defendants' liability, 
plaintiff could only expect to recover actual medical 
expenses and a fraction of her "diyah," which is a fixed 
amount of compensation for personal injury.156
On the basis of this discussion, the trial court ruled that the Saudi forum was not 
appropriate for plaintiff’s claims.157
The Court’s analysis is directly in contradistinction to the formalistic approach of 
Bridas.  Rhodes addresses the law first and foremost in relation to the plaintiff’s injuries. 
That Saudi Law makes the most sense given the approximation of the Plaintiff’s injuries 
is not the primary cause for the Court’s consideration.  Rather, the Court in reviewing the 
law of Saudi Arabia made a character judgment that Saudi Arabian law was inadequate 
for the court’s conception of justice.  In this sense, Rhodes is a good example of courts 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at *5.  
157 Id. 
that interpret Islamic law in terms of their own conceptions, rather than the unique 
postulations on which the system of law was built.  
c. Transliterative Approach
A third approach used by courts surveyed is a transliterative approach; that is, one 
takes concepts of Islamic law, finds parallels in American law, and then meets out the 
distinctions.  So, for example, when the Delaware Supreme Court heard the matter Saudi 
Basic Oil Industries v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical, 158 the court attempted to understand 
the Islamic principle of Ghasb in light of the word Usurpation.159  The Court’s approach 
could have been problematic had it confused the vernacular “usurpation” and the term of 
art “usurpation.” 160  Indeed, Islamic scholars suggest that Ghasb means an unjustified 
taking -- the vernacular meaning of Usurpation, tied to specific property.  An action for 
Ghasb would pit the property claimant against the property holder.  If the person who 
allegedly dispossessed the plaintiff of his property proved that he had a better right to the 
property, then the claim for Ghasb failed.  
158
 866 A.2d 1 (Del. 2005). In Saudi Basic, SABIC, a Saudi Arabian Corporation, created 
joint ventures with Mobil and Exxon to manufacture polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. The 
Joint Ventures specifically contracted to exclude the opportunity for the joint partners to 
gain a profit at each other’s expense.  
159
 Other issues were presented for review, including whether the trial court’s evidentiary 
rulings were accurate, whether the Delaware borrowing statute applied, and the 
contractual construction of claims.  This analysis only focuses on the Ghasb claims as 
relevant to Islamic law.  Id. at 11-30. 
160
 Guth v. Loft Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 1939). The artistic meaning is more refined.  
Usurpation, as used by U.S. Courts is a specific tort relating to fiduciaries that seize 
unfairly upon an opportunity that either is to be shared between the fiduciary and his 
principle or (in the case of a corporate officer) to be executed by the executive 
exclusively.160 Specifically, a Corporate officer or director may not take an opportunity 
for his own if: (1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity; (2) the 
opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business; (3) the corporation has an interest 
or expectancy in the project; and (4) by taking this opportunity for his own, the corporate 
fiduciary will be placed in a position inimicable to his duties to the corporation.
The Court in weighing the expert testimony regarding Ghasb concluded that 
“ExxonMobil [Plaintiff] must show by a preponderance of the evidence, that SABIC 
wrongfully exercised ownership or possessory rights over the property of another without 
consent, “which means with blatant or reckless disregard for those property rights.  The 
Conduct need not be intentional.”  The Court effectively used a vernacular concept 
(Usurpation) and then was able to narrow its wide definition, resist the temptation to 
mold the term towards its American meaning, and thereby render a just result.161
Importantly, the Court in SABIC saw itself performing the function of a Saudi 
Arabian judge.  Addressing the question of ijtihad first, the Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed the Trial Court’s reasoning and method.162     The Court began by defining the 
religious aspects of Saudi Arabian law, flowing from the Hanbali school.  Dr. Vogel 
testified that Saudi Judges “hew conservatively to the Hanbali school.”163  The Court also 
noted the differences between Saudi Arabian law and that of Common Law countries, 
specifically, that Islamic countries do not embrace precedent or stare decisis in the same 
way as western courts do; and the relative unavailability of law reports to the public.164
From this beginning the Supreme Court cited the trial judge’s rationale in applying 
Islamic law:
SABIC’s arguments ignore the simple truth that the 
circumstances under which Ghasb damages are available 
under Saudi law are not well known, much less defined, 
because Saudi law is not based on precedent or stare 
161
 The Court’s conclusion may also be seen as interpretive, as it was able to move 
beyond the concept of tangible physical or real property and allow usurpation over 
financial interests -- a result not addressed in Islamic literature, but appropriate 
nonetheless.  
162 Id. at 30
163 Id. at 30 n. 72.
164 Id.
decisis.  Contrary to the implication of SABIC’s briefing on 
this issue, the reality is that one cannot simply consult a 
statute book or a case reporter to find the elements of, or 
damages available for the Saudi law tort of Ghasb.  Nor can 
one point to one definition of, or a given set of 
circumstances giving rise to, Ghasb.  To illustrate the 
extreme difficulty of discerning and interpreting Saudi law, 
the Court notes that none of the Saudi law experts who 
testified agreed on the proper elements of Ghasb… Finally, 
because Saudi law decisions are not published, even if the 
decisions had precedential value (which all the experts 
agree they do not) the Court could not look to decisions of 
Saudi judges to determine the proper elements or define the 
recoverable damages.165
The Supreme Court in affirming this reasoning by the Superior Court Judge, noted that 
judges in Saudi Arabia must “first and last navigate within the boundaries” of the Hanbali 
School’s authoritative works, including works by Mansur-al-Bahuti, a 17th century 
scholar, as well as the works of Ibn Qudama and Al Maqdisi.166  The Court, noting 
testimony from Professor Hallaq that each time a Saudi law Judge exercises Ijtihad, “it is 
basically his best … effort to find what is the right thing to do,”167 affirmed the trial 
judge’s rationale as “doing the best it could to reach the right result.”
A second example of a court using a transliterative approach to Islamic law is in 
NGCC v. Lucent Technologies International, Inc.168 NGCC revolved around a 
contractual dispute relating to the installation of certain payphone and emergency phone 
stations in Saudia Arabia.  NGCC sued Lucent Technologies for failure to perform, and 
sought damages not only for the amounts injured, but for lost profits, future loss, and lost 
opportunity.  The central Islamic concept considered was that of Gharar.    
165 Id. at 31. 
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The Court’s analysis proceeded by explaining the context of Islamic law,169 the 
role of Islamic law judges within the legal system,170 and then the relation of the current 
dispute to the English vernacular.  The Court addressing Gharar said: 
A key doctrine within the Shari'a is the prohibition on 
"gharar," meaning risk or uncertainty. Gharar is absolutely 
repugnant to Islamic law. (Vogel Tr. 154-55:16-9). Future 
activity is deemed gharar because it is uncertain to anyone 
except for God. One of the consequences of this categorical 
rejection of gharar is that Saudi Arabian courts will not 
enforce the sale of anything uncertain or unknown. The 
object of a contract must be certain and defined and in 
existence. 171
One scholar expounded upon the implications that the 
prohibition of gharar has in producing differing 
understandings of contractual obligations under Western 
and Islamic law: In English law the sanctity of contract 
means that the promise endures despite the normal 
vicissitudes of fortune. It is right that the promise should be 
kept 'for better or for worse', 'through thick and thin', 
169 Id. The Shari'a is the product of several interrelated sources of religious authority.  
The doctrines comprising Shari'a are derived primarily from the Qur'an, the "Book of 
God." The Qur'an is considered the word of God as received by the Prophet Muhammed. 
Because the Qur'an commands adherents of Islam to obey the Prophet, the recorded 
examples of the acts and words of Muhammed, known as the "Sunnah," constitute an 
additional integral part of the Shari'a.  In the centuries since the founding of Islam, 
Islamic religious-legal scholars qualified to interpret the scriptural sources have produced 
opinions known as "fiqh." A complete understanding of the Shari'a in Saudi Arabia today 
also requires reference to any relevant fiqh for guidance. There are four schools of Shari'a 
law, each of which interprets Islamic doctrine somewhat differently. The predominant 
school followed in the courts of Saudi Arabia is known as the "Hanbali" school.  Id. 
(Citations omitted). 
170 When a Saudi Arabian judge, known as a "qadi," attempts to resolve disputes, his 
decision must be in accordance with the Shari'a. Therefore, he will turn to the 
aforementioned Qur'an, the Sunnah, and fiqh to guide his legal determination. Saudi 
Arabian judges are not bound by judicial precedent (in fact, Saudi Arabian judicial 
opinions are not published) and the concept of stare decisis does not exist. Instead, judges 
"must strive for the divine truth for each case that confronts him, without being bound by 
past opinions, even his own. Truth is the ultimate precedent, to which one must return 
once it is revealed. Id. (citations omitted). 
171 Id. citing Frank E. Vogel, The Contract Law of Islam and of the Arab Middle East, in
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because this in line with the popular belief that tenacity of 
purpose to some degree controls events and that the human 
will determines the future. The promise must dominate the 
circumstances. For Islam precisely the converse is true. 
Circumstances dominate the promise. Future circumstances 
are neither predictable nor controllable but lie entirely in 
the hands of the Almighty.... If the tide of affairs turns then 
the promise naturally floats out with it.172
Turning then to the facts of the case, the court noted that under Islamic law, damages 
available for breach of contract are generally limited to those loses which are actual and 
direct. 173  The Court further noted that “Saudi law will not allow damages which are 
ascertainable only by means involving speculation, contingencies, uncertainties or 
indeterminacy.”174  Thus, under the prohibition against Gharar, the Court will not allow
expectation damages to be heard.175  Additionally, under the same prohibition, Saudi law 
would not allow damages for lost profits, unrealized gains or future profits. The court’s 
assessment in NGCC is transliterative, as it approached a western concept -- expectation 
damages -- classified under an Islamic term, and then ruled according to the Islamic 
principles.  Like SABIC, the Court in NGCC saw itself assuming the same role as an 
Islamic jurist, a point discussed in section three below.    
PART THREE
Navigating Differences
The ways that courts approach the initial conflict of western and Islamic law 
determines to a great extent how they navigate the differences between the two.  As a 
general proposition, the courts that engage in formalistic approaches never navigate the 
172 Id. citing BALLANTYNE, ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES ON ARAB LAWS 274. 
173 Id. at 298. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
differences as their function is a mere rote application of principles without much 
reflection towards the issues.  Similarly, the interpretive approach exemplified by Rhodes 
tends to superficially highlight differences towards the specific agenda set forth by the 
court.  The transliterative approach tends to seek understanding of the differences and 
makes a conscious effort to navigate those differences to reach judicious results.  
The formalistic approach does not appear interested in the differences between 
Islamic law and Western law.  For example the primary corpus of the formalistic 
opinions is a conflicts of laws analysis that seems to govern the outcome of the cases 
more so than any applicable law.176  So, when the Court in Bridas decides that Afghani 
law will apply over Texas law, the application of Afghani law is secondary to the primary 
decision that determines the party’s liability.  Said another way, the conflicts of laws 
analysis enables formalistic application of law to the disputes, allowing courts to insulate 
themselves against the need to critically consider whether differences exist, whether those 
differences are just, and whether the court’s interpretation of those differences is correct.  
Similarly, when the Court engages in an interpretive methodology, the Court 
highlights the differences towards the result it wants to achieve.  Thus, in Rhodes, the 
court’s assessment that “Saudi law” would not protect the plaintiff’s interests in the same 
way as “Massachusetts law” may be correct on the surface level.177 Yet without any sort 
of meaningful exchange of concepts, the Court’s opinion seems less than unbiased. The 
Court chose not to move beyond the surface, but was content to mind its useful premise 
and build the opinion around differences that it sees as inconsistent with notions of 
justice.  So for Rhodes, the unavailability of speculative, indirect, or consequential 
177 Id. 
damages, an agency theory of tort, or certain trial procedures recommended the Court’s 
assumption of the matter regardless of the minimal contacts the plaintiff maintained with 
the court; indeed, the court does not even address this fact, but rather places the impetus 
of its decision on the unjust results that could result should Islamic law apply.
Finally, unlike the formalistic or interpretive approaches, the transliterative 
approach confronts the differences inherent in the legal systems, finds the principles 
applicable to the matter, and applies those principles to the case facts.  Thus in SABIC, 
the court is able to distinguish between western conceptions of Ghasb to reach a just 
solution to the dispute.  Similarly, the NGCC court navigates the western concepts of 
damages and aligns that concept with the principles of Islamic law that would mitigate 
against their application.  In both scenarios the court confronts the differences in the legal 
systems before moving towards application.  
PART FOUR
Judicial Self-Limitation.
A final aspect of this translation process is one of self-limitation.  Again the ways 
the courts address the cases dictate the extent that they limit their function.  Neither the 
formalistic courts nor the interpretive courts embrace self-limitation; rather the two 
methodologies on opposite ends of the spectrum tend to insulate themselves against 
Islamic law, but in different ways.  For the formalistic court the law (or procedure) itself 
provides an insulation away from the differences in the legal system. For the interpretive 
court, the perception that policy is more important that judicial procedure serves as an 
equal disservice -- it limits the court’s analysis to matters that don’t offend its policy 
consideration.  Only the courts that embrace a transliterative perspective truly become 
self-limiting in their function and thereby translate Islamic law appropriately.  
Analyzing the transliterative courts (SABIC and NGCC) two characteristics are 
apparent.  First, both courts appear to take the initiative of their own to understand the 
Islamic principles being described.  The SABIC judge retained a separate expert from the 
parties in an attempt to understand the contours of Islamic law.  The court of appeals 
commented on the SABIC judge’s approach:
Mindful of how daunting would be the task of determining 
the Saudi law principles applicable to this case, the trial 
judge made exceptional efforts to ensure that she was fully 
informed of the Hanbali teachings upon which to ground 
her legal rulings….After reviewing a total of over one 
thousand pages of deposition testimony, the trial judge then 
held a day long pre-trial hearing, to permit the parties to 
present live testimony [from their experts].
Similarly, the NGCC judge accepted not only the testimony presented by expert 
witnesses of the parties, but went outside their testimony to conduct research and cited 
that research in its opinion.  These Courts clearly saw themselves as doing more than 
arbitrating the parties’ disputes; rather they perceived their function as navigating the 
differences between Islamic and Western legal systems to arrive at a close approximation 
of justice. 
A second characteristic of both transliterative opinions is the threshold desire to 
understand their roles not from the traditional standpoint of western jurisprudence, but a 
willingness to embrace an Islamic approach to the law.  Notably the court in SABIC even 
addressed the methodology of using Ijtihad in coming to the best result:  “when faced 
with the daunting task of determining the elements of Ghasb and the damages available 
for this tort, the Court weighing the credibility of each Saudi law expert, exercised, as 
best it could under the circumstances ijtihad, to reach the “right result.”  Similarly, the 
court in NGCC began its analysis by describing the function of a Saudi law judge:
When a Saudi Arabian judge, known as a "qadi," attempts 
to resolve disputes, his decision must be in accordance with 
the Shari'a. Therefore, he will turn to the aforementioned 
Qur'an, the Sunnah, and fiqh to guide his legal 
determination. Saudi Arabian judges are not bound by 
judicial precedent (in fact, Saudi Arabian judicial opinions 
are not published) and the concept of stare decisis does not 
exist. (Vogel Tr. 143:2-4; Ballantyne Tr. 260-61:25- 1). 
Instead, judges "must strive for the divine truth for each 
case that confronts him, without being bound by past 
opinions, even his own. Truth is the ultimate precedent, to 
which one must return once it is revealed."178
The approach is more than just semantics.  It represents conscience efforts by the 
judiciary to embrace a different kind of role than it typically assumes -- a role as an 
Islamic jurist, rather than as a law judge.  
EPILOGUE
Approaching Islamic law is a daunting task, particularly for judges not trained in 
its philosophical underpinnings.  When western judges engage in applying Islamic 
principles in cases, there is a natural translation process.  The judge reacts to not only the 
Islamic principles he is engaging but his own environment as well.  In doing so, he 
reveals differences that are only revealed when the two sets of law collide.  As Judge, the 
way he approaches the case, whether he self-limits or self-aggrandizes, determines 
whether differences in Islamic law will be fruitfully understood or irrationally meted out.  
In Rhodes, the court did not attempt to understand the Islamic principles, and was content 
to brush over them, so as to render them meaningless to the court’s decision.  Similarly, 
178 Id citing VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE at 15.
formalistic opinions allow the court to safeguard itself by not delving into the differences, 
and rather remaining on the surface.  
Only the transliterative approach offers constructive methods for understanding 
Islamic law in the face of Western commerce.   In transliterating the law, the court 
redefines itself away from a role its most comfortable with towards areas of judicial 
uncertainty.  It is in that uncertainty that the Judge is able to confront the differences on 
an open plane, and truly seek just results.  
